Will Russia Be a Superpower Again
Paul Krugman
Russia Is a Potemkin Superpower
Beware, Vladimir Putin: Spring is coming. And when it does, yous'll lose much of whatever leverage you had left.
Before Putin invaded Ukraine, I might have described the Russia as a medium-size power punching higher up its weight in part past exploiting Western divisions and abuse, in part by maintaining a powerful military. Since then, even so, ii things have get clear. First, Putin has delusions of grandeur. Second, Russian federation is even weaker than well-nigh people, myself included, seem to have realized.
It has long been obvious that Putin desperately wants to restore Russia's status as a Great Power. His already infamous "there is no such thing equally Ukraine" speech, in which he condemned Lenin (!) for giving his neighbour what Putin considers a imitation sense of national identity, made it clear that his aims go beyond recreating the Soviet Matrimony — he manifestly wants to recreate the czarist empire. And he apparently idea that he could accept a big step toward that goal with a curt, victorious war.
And then far, it hasn't worked out equally planned. Ukrainian resistance has been violent; Russia'southward military has been less effective than advertised. I've been especially struck by reports that the early days of the invasion were hampered past severe logistical problems — that is, the invaders had a hard time providing their forces with the essentials of modern war, above all fuel. It's true that supply problems are common in war; all the same, logistics is one affair avant-garde nations are supposed to be really good at.
But Russian federation is looking less and less like an advanced nation.
The truth is that I was being generous in describing Russia as even a medium-size power. Great britain and France are medium-size powers; Russian federation's gross domestic product is only a bit more half every bit large as either'south. Information technology seemed remarkable that such an economically underweight land could support a earth-grade, highly sophisticated military machine — and maybe information technology couldn't.
That's not to deny that the forcefulness ravaging Ukraine has immense firepower, and it may well take Kyiv. But I wouldn't exist surprised if mail-mortems on the Ukraine state of war eventually show that there was a lot more rot at the heart of Putin's military than anyone realized.
And Russia is starting to await even weaker economically than information technology did before information technology went to war.
Putin isn't the first brutal dictator to make himself an international pariah. As far every bit I can tell, however, he's the start to practise so while presiding over an economy securely dependent on international commerce — and with a political elite accepted, more or less literally, to treating Western democracies as their playground.
For Putin'south Russia isn't a hermetic tyranny like Democratic people's republic of korea or, for that matter, the old Soviet Marriage. Its standard of living is sustained by big imports of manufactured goods, mostly paid for via exports of oil and natural gas.
This leaves Russia's economic system highly vulnerable to sanctions that might disrupt this trade, a reality reflected in Monday'south sharp plunge in the value of the ruble despite a huge increase in domestic interest rates and draconian attempts to limit capital flight.
Earlier the invasion it was mutual to talk about how Putin had created "fortress Russian federation," an economy immune to economical sanctions, by accumulating a huge war chest of strange currency reserves. Now, however, such talk seems naïve. What, after all, are foreign reserves? They aren't bags of cash. For the about part they consist of deposits in overseas banks and holdings of other governments' debt — that is, assets that can exist frozen if most of the world is united in revulsion confronting a rogue authorities'south war machine aggression.
Truthful, Russia too has a substantial amount of concrete gold held inside the country. But how useful is this gilded equally a way to pay for things the Putin government needs? Can you really conduct large-calibration modern business organisation with ingots?
Finally, as I noted last week, Russian federation's oligarchs have stashed near of their assets overseas, making them subject to freezing or seizure if democratic governments can muster the volition. You lot might say that Russia doesn't need those assets, which is true. But everything Putin has done in office suggests that he considers it necessary to buy oligarchs' back up, then their vulnerability is his vulnerability.
Incidentally, one puzzle nearly Russia's pre-Ukraine paradigm of strength was how a kleptocratic authorities managed to have an efficient, effective armed services. Perhaps it didn't?
Notwithstanding, Putin has one remaining ace in the hole: Feckless policies have made Europe deeply dependent on Russian natural gas, potentially inhibiting the West's response to his aggression.
Merely Europe mainly burns gas for heat; gas consumption is 2.5 times higher in the wintertime than it is in the summer. Well, winter will soon be over — and the Eu has time to prepare for another wintertime without Russian gas if information technology's willing to make some hard choices.
As I said, Putin may well take Kyiv. But even if he does, he will take made himself weaker, non stronger. Russia now stands revealed every bit a Potemkin superpower, with far less real strength than meets the heart.
Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/opinion/putin-military-sanctions-weakness.html
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